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INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING AID TO
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN CIVIL WAR:
RESURRECTING THE STANDARDS OF
BELLIGERENCY
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil wars and wars of revolution are a part of America's past and
its foreign policy present and future. Since World War II the world's
wars have been largely wars of insurgency.1 The destructive capacity
of nuclear weapons makes total world war remote.2 However, the
breakdown of colonial empires, dissatisfaction with the distribution of
wealth, and the rise of people's expectations have made civil war a fact
of twentieth century politics.3 Superpowers, in competition for allies
and influence, have often armed these conflicts, leading to an increase
in the duration and destructiveness of civil wars.4
Despite its revolutionary inception, the United States has often
sided with the incumbent government in these wars.5 In the 1980's,
however, the United States has increasingly funded armed opposition
groups. Aid for groups such as the Afghan mujahedeen has received
bipartisan support; assistance to the contra rebels has met with strong
Congressional and grassroots opposition.
The United States has often looked to international law to justify its
assistance of armed opposition groups. International law includes
numerous provisions that regulate the conduct of states in times of
* Associate, Shidler, McBroom, Gates & Lucas, Seattle, Washington; B.A. 1983, Pacific
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1. J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT: INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF WAR 33 (1974);
Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law ofInternal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
CIVIL STRIFE 185 (J. Roseneau ed. 1964). Some estimate that 80-90% of the victims of armed
conflict after World War II were victims of noninternational conflicts. See G. VON GLAHN,
LAW AMONG NATIONS 614 (5th ed. 1986).
2. Farer, Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, in 1 THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 509, 510-11 (R. Falk ed. 1968); Luard, Civil Conflicts il Modern
International Relations, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 7, 9 (E. Luard
ed. 1972).
3. Luard, supra note 2, at 10-1I.
4. Id. at 15.
5. R. TAllER, THE WAR OF THE FLEA: A STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE THEORY AND
PRACriSE 174 (1965).
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war.6 These laws, however, are more relevant to world wars with
many states openly participating, than to civil wars.7 Moreover, gov-
ernments regularly neglect those traditional laws which concern the
legality of aiding an armed opposition group.'
There is a need to rethink and restate the laws of war as they relate
to civil war. The reformulation must take account of present realities,
the most important of which is the interference of outside govern-
ments in civil strife. The challenge is to create a rule of law that chan-
nels behavior in a constructive way.9 A rule requiring abstinence, no
matter how well intentioned, will likely be disregarded. 0
One important standard is the traditional law of belligerency.
Although the doctrine has fallen into disuse, the belligerency stan-
dards are a good test of the legitimacy of an armed opposition group
as an actor for social, political, or religious change on behalf of dissat-
isfied citizens. Nations need not return to formal declarations of bel-
ligerency. The belligerency criteria, however, should be resurrected as
a threshold test for assisting armed opposition groups. Use of the bel-
ligerency standards in this way generally assures that before the group
can receive international assistance, it must attain widespread popular
support and operate with a respect for human rights.
In the United States, Congress should play a lead role in implement-
ing standards which prescribe when the United States may aid armed
opposition groups. Congress is the actor in foreign policy most apt to
use international law as a restraint on warmaking. t' To be effective in
6. See. e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3362. 75 U.N.T.S.
31, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded. Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219. T.I.A.S. No. 3363.
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Aug. 12.
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135: Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Prisoners in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3517, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287: Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403. 26 Martens Nouveau Recuel (ser. 2) 949; Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. TS No.
539. 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461.
7. See Falk. 'upra note I at 185-86.
8. See J. BONI), Vipra note 1, at 33-34; Farer. vtpra note 2, at 514-16: Higgins. Interonational
Law atd Civil Conflici. in Tiii INTIRNATIONAI Rit(.ut A HON 01- Civil W \RS 169. 172 (E
Luard ed. 1972).
9. R. F,\IK, TI- INt'II-RNION,\I LAW Ot Civil WARS 1. 10 (R. Falk ed. 1971)
(introduction).
10. Farer. mupra note 2, at 517-18.
11. See Kreisberg, Does the U.S. Government Think that International Law Iv Itnportant?. I I
Yi I J. IN'I"I L. 479, 482-83 (1986): Schachter. I Defense of International Rules on the Uve oj
Force. 53 U. Cm. L. Rt-v. 113, 118 (1986).
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this capacity, Congress needs standards that allow the United States to
defend its interests in the contemporary world without compromising
its respect for international law.12 The belligerency test strikes this
balance. Congress needs to have standards in place before executive
action. The belligerency standards should be adopted by Congress as
permanent threshold test criteria, employed whenever the executive
wishes to assist armed opposition groups in civil war.
II. THE LAWS OF WAR: ARMED OPPOSITION IN A
LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Evolution of the Laws of War
International law of war has a history of fits and starts. Initially,
international law sought to restrain the use of force under the doctrine
of "just wars."13 With roots in Roman Catholic thought, this doctrine
describes the circumstances in which it is just to resort to war to solve
an international conflict. This notion was difficult to enforce and was
subject to the subjective interpretation of every head of state. The
"just war" period was followed by an era in which war simply became
a fact of life in international relations. 4
Perspectives changed somewhat after the destruction of World War
I. Nations attempted to prevent future wars by concluding treaties,
such as the Kellogg-Briand pact, which outlawed resort to war to
resolve international controversies.' 5 The League of Nations insti-
tuted procedural checks in an attempt to restrain the use of force, for
the most part without success.' 6
Following the second World War, member nations drafted Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter to prohibit the use of force, except
for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51.17 The Gen-
eral Assembly has refined the definition of "use of force" in resolutions
such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance
12. Falk, supra note 1, at 186-87.
13. See Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 191, 192 (1983).
14. Id.
15. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; see
Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 74, 75 (1984).
16. Moore, supra note 13, at 193.
17. See id.
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with the Charter of the United Nations.' 8 Recently, the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua case ("Paramilitary Activities" case) ruled
that, apart from Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter,
customary international law prohibits the use of force against another
nation, except in self-defense.' 9 The I.C.J. also ruled that the use of
force against a country violates customary international law prohibit-
ing intervention in the internal affairs of a country.2 °
B. Traditional Law of Civil War
Traditional international law of war puts internal wars into three
categories: Rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.2 ' Rebellions are
small-scale, localized conflicts which are usually solved with police
measures.2 2 A state of belligerency is on the opposite end of the pole.
An insurgency is a conflict that lies somewhere between a rebellion
and a state of belligerency.2 3 A state of belligerency may be declared
when four elements are met: One, the conflict is more widespread
than a local dispute; two, the opposition controls a significant portion
of territory; three, the opposition administers the occupied land; and
four, the opposition is obeying international laws of war.24 A nation
may recognize a condition of belligerency either by state action or by a
formal declaration.2 1 Outside nations may also declare neutrality dur-
ing a state of belligerency so that they are entitled to protection of the
laws of neutrality during times of war.2 6
18. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1971).
19. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986
I.C.J. 14, 99-102 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
20. Id. at 107-08.
21. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-50 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
22. Boals, The Relevance of International Law to Internal War in Yemen. in THr
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WARS, supra note 9, at 303, 313. A rebellion usually is a minor
instance of internal war. Rebellions include violent protests involving a single issue (Indian
language riots; Soviet food riots) or an uprising so rapidly suppressed as to warrant no
acknowledgment of its existence at an international level (East European rebellions against So,iet
domination). Falk, supra note I, at 199.
23. Boals, vupra note 22, at 313-14. A state of insurgency might also exist because nations
failed to formally declare a state of belligerency. See E. LUARD, CONFLICT AND PEACE IN THi
MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 155 (1968).
24. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAl LAW 270-71 (1947); 2 L
OPPFiNHEIM, supra note 21, at 249-50; G. VON GLAHN, supra note 1, at 617.
25 Falk, supra note 1, at 203. A nation can recognize a state of belligerency by respecting a
blockade instituted by one of the combatants.
26. Id.; E. LUARD, supra note 23, at 154.
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The categories are significant because they determine whether it is
legal to give assistance to an armed opposition group. Governments
are prohibited from giving aid to rebels during a local rebellion,
although they may give aid to the incumbent government. 27 An insur-
gent group is deserving of "recognition" under international law.2 8
Outside governments, however, are only permitted to give assistance
to the incumbent government and not the insurgents, 29 although some
scholars contend that aid to the incumbent government should be fro-
zen or terminated as well once a situation of insurgency exists.30
When a state of belligerency exists, an outside government may give
formal diplomatic recognition to the belligerent group and may give it
military or economic aid.31
Although the distinctions between types of civil wars are longstand-
ing precepts of international law, the last time that they were seriously
applied was in the American Civil War. 32 Nations have ignored the
formality of declaring a state of belligerency in recent civil wars,
including those in the Congo,33 Yeman,34 and Algeria .3  This has led
scholars to assert that the doctrine of belligerency does not comport
with the realities of modern civil war.3 6
Commentators criticize use of the belligerency standards because
there is no central international body to judge or declare when a state
of belligerency exists.37 They also criticize the notion that it is legal to
give aid to an incumbent government of questionable legitimacy, while
aid to an insurgent group is prohibited.3  Nations have intervened in
civil strife when it suits them, regardless of the prerequisites for sup-
27. E. LUARD, supra note 23, at 154.
28. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 24, at 270-71.
29. E. LUARD, supra note 23, at 155.
30. See Moore, A Theoretical Overview of the Laws of War in a Post-Charter World, with
Emphasis on the Challenge of Civil Wars, "Wars of National Liberation," Mixed Civil-
International Wars, and Terrorism, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 841, 845 (1982).
31. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 24, at 175-76; see also Boals, supra note 22, at 313;
Fraleigh, The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WARS, supra note 9, at 179, 210-15. Some writers contend that
once the belligerency standards exist, states are under a duty to make a declaration of
belligerency. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 24, at 175-76, 240-43.
32. Wright, The American Civil War, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WARS, supra
note 9, at 30, 49.
33. McNemar, The Postindependence War in the Congo, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
CIVIL WARS, supra note 9, at 244.
34. Boals, supra note 22, at 313-14.
35. Fraleigh, supra note 31, at 217.
36. Higgins, supra note 8, at 171; Luard, supra note 2, at 20.
37. Falk, supra note 1, at 206; Higgins, supra note 8, at 171.
38. Farer, supra note 2, at 514-16.
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porting a belligerent. Commentators declare that declarations of bel-
ligerency have become a dead letter in international law.3 9
The International Court of Justice's opinion in the Paramilitary
Activities case does not address the doctrine of belligerency. The court
did not settle the question of when international law permits states to
assist armed opposition groups. The court, however, did make several
significant pronouncements on intervention in civil strife. It held that
no general right to intervene in support of an opposition group exists
in international law.4" The I.C.J. ruled that arming and training rebel
groups amounts to a "threat or use of force" under customary interna-
tional law, but solely supplying funds to a rebel group does not.4
Both types of assistance, however, breach the customary law prohibit-
ing intervention in the internal affairs of a country.42 In addition, the
court held that, under customary international law, providing weap-
ons or other support to a rebel group does not constitute an "armed
attack" against the incumbent government which would permit the
incumbent government to resort to self-defense.43
C. The Search for New Standards To Govern Civil War
The demise of the doctrine of belligerency and the proliferation of
intervention in civil strife have prompted international law scholars to
search for new standards to govern third country intervention in civil
war, including a call for new conferences on the law of war to deal
with the problem.44 Many third world nations and Soviet bloc coun-
tries contend that intervention is justified to oust colonial powers and
racist regimes. 45 They rely on the provision of the United Nations
Charter that guarantees the self-determination of peoples. Self-deter-
mination has found expression in numerous United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions, as well as the 1977 Geneva Protocols on the
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict.46 The I.C.J. in the Paramili-
39. J. BONI), supra note 1, at 33-34; Higgins, supra note 8, at 171.
40. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986
I.C.J. 14, 109-10 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
41. Id. at 119.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 103-04.
44. See J BOND, supra note 1, at 194. The conferences that drafted the Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions did not take up this task. See Gasser. Internatiooal No-Itternational
Arined Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan. Kampuchea, and Lebanon. 31 Am. U.L. REV. 911.
912 (1982).
45. Beres, Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in Central
America. 14 Di!N. J. INT't L. & Pot,'Y 75, 79-80 (1985).
46. See. cg., G.A. Res. 2383, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968):
G.A. Res. 3103. 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) Diplomatic
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tary Activities case alluded to interventions to oust colonial powers but
did not rule on or elaborate on such an exception to the general rule of
nonintervention in internal disputes.47
Some writers contend that the standard of intervention should, in
part, depend upon whether the civil war occurs in a country's sphere
of influence.4" Other commentators look to more mechanical and
objective tests for determining whether a grant of aid to an armed
opposition group is lawful. For example, the doctrine of "counter-
intervention" has been recognized as an emerging law of intervention
in civil strife.49 Under counterintervention, if a state intervenes on
behalf of one side, other states are free to provide assistance of an
equal nature to the opposing side to counter the effect of the initial
grant.
International law could also set caps on the type and quantity of
assistance provided both to the opposition and to the incumbent gov-
ernment. For example, it might be appropriate to provide military
training and noncombat advisors, but not to participate directly
through the use of troops or transport crafts."0 Some scholars contend
that all aid, to both the opposition and the incumbent, should be fro-
zen once a genuine internal conflict begins.51
Legal standards are ineffective unless they can minimize the discre-
tion of individual nations. Thus, many encourage increased use of
supranational organizations to police compliance with whatever
norms are agreed upon to govern international intervention in civil
Conference on Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict:
Protocols I and 11 Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45), U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977). The Reagan
administration has recommended against ratification of Protocol I, in large part due to the
Protocol's treatment of wars of national liberation. See Letter of Submittal from the Secretary of
State, Dec. 13, 1986, reprinted in 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 563 (1987); see also Cassese, The
Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary
International Law, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 55, 68 (1984).
47. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 108-10 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
48. Falk, supra note 1, at 237.
49. See Id. at 207; Higgins, supra note 8, at 176-77; see also Farer, supra note 2, at 518. Farer
contends that we should legitimate assistance short of tactical military support, either to
incumbent governments or rebels. But he would absolutely prohibit commitment of combat
troops, battlefield advisors, or volunteers, no matter how few or how negligible their effect.
Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife. 82
HARV. L. REv. 511, 532-36 (1969).
50. See Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
225, 227-28 (1983).
51. See Moore, A Theoretical Overview of the Laws of War in a Post-Charter World. with
Emphasis on the Challenge of Civil Wars, "'Wars of National Liberation," Mixed Civil-
International Wars, and Terrorism. 31 AM. U.L. REv. 841, 845 (1982).
Washington Law Review
wars.
52
Policy makers in the United States have also searched for legal justi-
fications to explain their recent grants of assistance to various opposi-
tion groups. Particularly with respect to aid to the contra rebels in
Nicaragua, the debate over the legality of United States support has
been heated. The United States government argues that its aid to the
contras is based on the idea of collective self-defense.53 The United
States government contends that because Nicaragua is funding revolu-
tionaries against various Central American governments, the United
States may fund the contras against the Nicaraguan government.5 4 In
addition, the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention has
been raised as a possible justification for intervention in civil war, pri-
marily with respect to aid to Miskito indian groups who oppose the
Sandinista government.55
Officials in the Reagan administration have recently contended that
the United States is justified in giving aid to opposition groups that are
fighting to install a democratic government in their country.5 6 This
theory is commonly called the "Reagan doctrine." Based on the Rea-
gan doctrine, the President has asked for funding for opposition
groups in Angola, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan.57
III. CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
FOR CIVIL WAR
The new analyses of the law of civil strife have fallen short of dra-
matically improving the traditional laws of war.58 Grants of assist-
ance to peoples struggling for self-determination draw some support
from codification of the right to self-determination in numerous multi-
lateral conventions.59 Those conventions, however, do not explicitly
validate outside aid to achieve the right. If international law permits
52. See Falk, supra note 1, at 227; Higgins, supra note 8, at 178-79.
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 102 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
54. Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of
Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 651-67 (1985); Comment, The Legal
Implications of United States Policy Towards Nicaragua: A Machiavellian Dilemma, 22 SAN
DIE GO L. REV. 895, 929-36 (1985); see Motley, Is Peace Possible in Central Amnerica?. DEP'T ST.
BuLL., Mar. 1984, at 67-69.
55. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 54, at 667-70.
56. See Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force. 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
113, 142-44 (1986). For a spirited exchange on the Reagan Doctrine, see generally TAKING THE
STAND: THE TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL OLIVER L. NORTH (1987).
57. See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
58. See Falk, supra note 1, at 188, 191.
59. Cassese, supra note 46, at 68-69.
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those struggling for self-determination to receive outside assistance in
their struggle, self-determination is afforded special status over the
struggle for other basic human rights, such as the right to political or
religious freedom, where assistance is not sanctioned. Those seeking
to legitimize intervention on behalf of rebels fighting for self-determi-
nation are in some measure returning to the days of "just wars."6
A second problem with permitting assistance to peoples struggling
for self-determination is that the right itself is ill-defined and subject to
manipulation by states that desperately want to justify intervention. It
is often open to question as to whether the opposition group is fighting
for those who qualify as a "peoples" under international human rights
law, or whether the group is a legitimate representative of a qualified
"peoples." The problem of definition also applies to the purported
right to assist groups seeking to throw off a "racist government."
Beyond the core problem of defining racism, it may be difficult to
determine whether a racist regime is one that has laws institutional-
izing discrimination, or whether government action or inaction short
of that would be sufficient.6 '
The problem of permitting nations to exercise too much discretion
might be remedied if the judgment regarding intervention were placed
in the hands of a supranational organization such as the United
Nations. This recommendation, however, is beset with difficulties as
well. The demise of the effectiveness of the United Nations in war and
peace matters hardly bears repeating. 62 Confidence in supranational
organizations is on the wane, not on the rise, in the latter part of the
twentieth century.
If decisions concerning the legitimacy of intervention were left to
the Security Council, the decisions seem destined to fall prey to the
same sort of deadlock that has prevailed in the Council over recent
cases of use of force. 63 Western nations would likely object to determi-
nations on intervention being made in the General Assembly where
they are hopelessly outnumbered and could be bullied by third world
60. Id.; Moore, supra note 13, at 195-96.
61. See generally Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 150, 150-63 (I.
Brownlie 2d ed. 1981).
62. See E. LUARD, supra note 23, at 157-61; Higgins, supra note 8, at 178-80; Luard, supra
note 2, at 23-25; see also J. CROSS, CONFLICT IN THE SHADOWS: THE NATURE AND POI.ITICS
OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 158-60 (1963) (United Nations has difficulty coping with conflict by
or against states of major power blocs and with unconventional wars).
63. See supra note 62; McDougal, Law and Minimum World Public Order Armed Conflict in
Larger Context, 3 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 21, 31 (1984).
Washington Law Review
states and the Eastern bloc.64 Likewise, nations from all parts of the
globe have eschewed submitting matters of war and peace to the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
65
The various objective standards that have been proposed to circum-
scribe intervention in civil wars, such as "counterintervention" and
caps on the quality and quantity of assistance, arguably have positive
qualities. They remove political value judgments from the evaluation
of whether intervention is lawful. The rules apply to civil wars across
the board, regardless of political orientation. The rules implicitly
acknowledge that intervention is a fact of life and that it is the role of
international law to describe the content of intervention, rather than
wish it away.66
The proposed objective standards, however, have their limitations.
The right to counterintervention merely recognizes the present reality
of international participation in national wars: when one superpower
intervenes on behalf of either the incumbent government or the oppo-
sition, another superpower will intervene on the other side to prevent
the country from falling into the "enemy camp." The law of counter-
intervention does nothing to delimit the incidence or scope of interven-
tion. The same is true of the school that would tolerate interventions
within a superpower's sphere of influence.
Counterintervention, coupled with proposed limits on the quantity
and type of assistance, moves in the direction of describing some limit
to intervention. For example, counter-assistance could be limited to
the amount given to the other side, with those aiding the incumbent
required to freeze aid at pre-civil war levels to prevent escalation.
While it makes some theoretical sense for international law to equalize
the war in terms of outside assistance, permitting "the best man to
win," the equalization standard runs counter to the reason for outside
intervention in the first place. An outside nation generally intervenes
because it wants its side to prevail. The incentive is to give aid so that
the opposition ally will gain the upper hand or the incumbent govern-
ment ally will successfully squelch unrest, not to equalize the odds.
Moreover, the difficulty of monitoring the counterintervention and the
levels and types of aid given raises workability problems.
64. See generally Higgins, supra note 8, at 178-80.
65. Most recently Iran, and then the United States. See generally Comment, Reaccepting the
Compulsory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States
Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1145 (1986) (United States joins countries such as the Soviet
Union, the Peoples Republic of China, and Iran in rejecting the Court's jurisdiction).
66. See, e.g.. Falk, supra note 1, at 207-08; Farer, supra note 2. at 517-18.
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IV. CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES'
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
GROUPS: THE CONTRAS AS AN EXAMPLE
The United States' justifications for lending assistance to the rebels
in Nicaragua have come under attack from scholars and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. If the scale of human rights abuses against the
Miskito Indians was egregious, the United States might intervene on
the basis of humanitarian intervention.67 Recent evidence, however,
seems to suggest that the abuses have abated significantly.68 More-
over, the intervention would have to be in strict adherence to the
guidelines for humanitarian intervention,69 including the provision
that the intervention not be designed to overthrow the authority struc-
ture of the incumbent government.7 ° Indeed, the United States has
been reluctant to couch its support of the rebels in terms of humanita-
rian intervention, perhaps fearing that it will set a precedent for other
nations to intervene at other times, ostensibly for humanitarian
motives. 71
The International Court of Justice, applying customary interna-
tional law, has rejected the United States' claim that United States aid
to the contras is legitimate under the doctrine of collective self-
defense.72 The court rejected the United States' position for several
reasons. First, the right of self-defense exists only in response to an
armed attack. The court ruled that providing assistance to opposition
groups, even arms and logistical support, does not amount to an
67. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 54, at 655-57; see Ryan, Nicaragua Still Denies Indian
Rights, Seattle Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at A12, col. I. But see Burke, The "Genocide" in
Nicaragua, Seattle Times, Apr. 27, 1987, at A13, col. 1 (calling alleged Sandinista genocide of
Miskito Indians a CIA hoax). There is some dispute among scholars as to the legitimacy of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Compare Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217, 217-28 (J. Moore ed. 1974) with Lillich,
Humanitarian Intervention. A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra, at 229, 229-51.
68. See Burke, The "Genocide" in Nicaragua, Seattle Times, Apr. 27, 1987, at A13, col. 1.
69. Beres, supra note 45, at 78-79.
70. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 54, at 656.
71. Id. at 657.
72. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 146 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27). For a discussion of the merits and demerits
of the United States' claim of self-defense, see Friedlander, Confusing Victims and Victhnizers:
Nicaragua and the Reinterpretation ofInternationalLaw, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 87, 92-93
(1985); Reichler and Wippman, U.S. Armued Intervention in Nicaragua: A Rejoinder, 11 YALE J.
INT'L L. 462 (1986); Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited, 11 YALE J. INT'L.
L. 437, 454 (1986). See generally Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of
World Public Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986); Rowles, The United States. the O.A.S., and the
Dilenmna of the Undesirable Regime 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 385 (1983).
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armed attack under international law.73 Thus, Nicaraguan assistance
to opposition groups in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras did
not rise to the level of an armed attack permitting United States inter-
vention in defense of the aggrieved governments.
Second, in order for a third country to legally intervene on behalf of
another in collective self-defense, the victim of the armed attack must
request the support of the third country.7 4 The I.C.J. in Paramilitary
Activities found that none of the victims of attacks by Nicaraguan-
supported rebels requested the United States to assist them in collec-
tive self-defense.75 Third, the I.C.J. concluded that the United States'
actions did not meet the elements of "necessity" and "proportionality"
which are generally accepted elements of a claim of self-defense. The
Court ruled that the United States did not comply with the condition
of "necessity" because it instigated support for the contras several
months after the threat of the Salvadoran rebels had been repulsed and
rebel activities had been greatly reduced.76 The Court ruled that the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors, attacks on ports and oil installations,
and the continuation of aid long after the presumed attack by Nicara-
gua violated the condition of proportionality.77
As a member of the Organization of American States ("O.A.S.") the
United States has treaty obligations in addition to its obligations under
customary international law. In order for the United States to act in
collective self-defense, some commentators contend that the United
States must, in a timely fashion, invoke the Rio Treaty, activating the
collective defense provisions of the O.A.S. alliance.78 To date, neither
the United States nor El Salvador has submitted control of the conflict
to the O.A.S. Indeed many inter-American treaties seem to prohibit
intervention in the affairs of another American state under most
circumstances.79
The Reagan doctrine is somewhat akin to the just war doctrine and
is the democratic counterpart to the Third World/Soviet bloc argu-
ment that aiding opponents of colonial or racist regimes is legitimate.
Thus, the Reagan doctrine is subject to the same criticisms as the
73. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986
I.C.J. 14, 103-04 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
74. Id. at 105.
75. Id. at 119-23.
76. Id. at 122.
77. Id. at 122-23.
78. Joyner & Grimaldi. mupra note 54. at 665-67: Comment. supra note 54. at 932-36.
Professor Moore takes issue with Joyner and Grimaldi's argument. Moore. The Secret War ill
Central America and the Future of Word Public Orcer, 80 AMt. J. INTI L. 43. 104-05 (1986).
79. See Comment. vupra note 54. at 915-18.
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traditional just war doctrine and its contemporary renditions. United
States aid to democratic opposition groups is beset with other difficul-
ties.8" The extent of the opposition's commitment to democracy is
often open to questionl--indeed, many Marxist groups claim to be
fighting for democracy. Groups sporting the democratic label may not
have a substantial following in their native country. Some groups
claiming to fight for democracy alienate citizens by abusing human
rights.
The I.C.J. in the Paramilitary Activities case pointed out that the
United States has raised intervention based on ideology as a political
argument, not a legal one. The court's opinion seems to intimate that
intervention based on the ideology of an opposition group is contrary
to customary international law.82
It is clear that the United States is groping for legal standards that
will allow it to protect its interests and pursue its foreign policy goals.
Legal norms are most often used by the executive branch as post hoe
justifications rather than standards for behavior.83 Congress has
stepped in from time to time to impose conditions on the grant of
foreign aid to incumbent governments or opposition groups,8 4 but the
conditions were imposed on a case-by-case basis, after the executive
had acted. If international law is to be effective as a force to construc-
tively channel United States intervention in civil wars, it must be a
permanent factor in the decision-making process, and it must comport
with political realities and the realities of civil war.8
80. Schachter, supra note 56, at 142-44. Cross argues that non-communist insurgents face
two difficulties: First, the communist state often employs tough measures of repression and has
strong control of society; second, it is difficult for the insurgents to have specific positive political
objectives. J. CROSS, supra note 62, at 132-34.
81. The opposition in Angola, headed by a former student of Mao Tse-tung, Jonas Savimbi, is
an example. See Angola's Resilient Rebel, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1986, at 11.
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 108-10 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
83. See Kreisberg, supra note 1I, at 480.
84. See W. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS-WHO HOLDS
THE ARROWS AND THE OLIVE BRANCH 25, 226-27 (1981).
85. R. FALK, supra note 9, at 10; Falk, supra note 1, at 188; Friedlander, supra note 72, at 88;
Kreisberg, supra note 11, at 481.
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V. A NEW STANDARD FOR ASSISTANCE TO REBEL
GROUPS; AN OLD STANDARD REEXAMINED
AND REVITALIZED
A. The Proposak A United States Standard for Assisting
Opposition Groups
The United States should only give assistance to armed opposition
groups that have qualified as a belligerent under international law. In
order to satisfy the test of belligerency the opposition group must:
One, control a significant portion of national territory; two, administer
the territory it controls; three, comply with international laws of
war. 6 In addition, the conflict with the incumbent government must
be more than a local disturbance.87
The belligerency guidelines should be adopted by Congress as per-
manent threshold guidelines to be utilized in every instance in which
the President requests Congress to grant financial assistance to an
armed opposition group.88
The guidelines should apply to all types of military assistance (for
example, troop training, sales of arms, logistical support, intelligence
sharing). The guidelines should also apply to so-called humanitarian
assistance (such as clothing, food, and medicine), unless the aid com-
plies with International Red Cross standards for giving humanitarian
assistance.89 However, the guidelines should not prevent the United
86. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, at 249-50; G. VON GILAHN, supra note 1, at 617.
87. See supra note 86. Some writers add a condition that states have "a practical necessity to
define their attitude to the civil war." See 2 L. OPPtNHEtN. supra note 21, at 249-50. This
requirement was added to Oppenheim's treatise in its sixth edition. See Id. at v. 197-98.
Compare the sixth edition with 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAl_ LAWv 205 (H. Lauterpacht
5th ed.) and 2 L. OPPI-NHEIM, INTERNATIONAl LxW 154 (A. McNair 4th ed.). The ne\s
requirement was included to prevent "abuse for the purpose of a gratuitous manifestation of
sympathy with the cause of the insurgents.- 2 L. OPPLNHA.IM. supra note 21. at 250. It is
dubious whether this purpose is attainable because, among other reasons, most nations find it
always necessary to define their relation to a dispute for diplomatic and ideological reasons.
88. Congress must establish specific guidelines and criteria which will help it decide whether
the belligerency standards have been met. The guidelines should set out how much territory will
constitute a "significant portion" of national territory. In addition. the criteria could provide
guidance as to what types of activities and organization will lead Congress to conclude that the
opposition "'administers the territory." For example. is there a nonmilitary government
organization. are taxes collected, are health and education services provided? Congress must
also use its resources to gather information in the field regarding whether the guidelines have
been met.
89. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986
I.C.J. 14, 124-25 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27) (in order to escape condemnation as
internal intervention, aid must be limited to Red Cross purposes--to "prevent and alles ate
human suffering" and "'protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being:" the
aid must also be given without discrimination).
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States from making diplomatic contacts with the opposition group.
B. Rationale for United States Employment of the Belligerency Test
From the standpoint of the United States, a rule of international law
applicable to assistance to opposition groups in civil war must cut a
delicate balance between the United States' need to intervene in civil
war when it is in the national interest and an aspiration to limit the use
of war as a policy tool.90 The rule cannot be so detached from current
state practice and strategic reality that the United States government
will constantly see compliance as incompatible with its best interest.
International law should not be weakened to the point of permitting
unlimited intervention in civil war without an attempt to channel or
mold the interference in a constructive fashion.9" The long-neglected
belligerency standards seem to strike this delicate balance.
The requirement that an opposition group control a significant por-
tion of land and implement an administrative structure will help to
assure that the group has legitimacy as a representative of people
struggling for social, political, or religious change. The belligerency
standards comport with the method that guerrillas use to wage popu-
lar insurgency.
Initially guerrillas do not concentrate on seizing territory from the
government.9" Their first task is political rather than military.93 The
guerrillas must convince the population that the guerrillas' cause is the
people's own and increase popular participation in the revolution. 94
The people are only willing to participate in organized violence if there
is no alternative, the cause is compelling, and there is a reasonable
expectation of victory. 95 "Without the consent and active aid of the
people, the guerrilla would be a bandit and could not long survive."96
If the revolution grows, the guerrillas are able to hold territory.9 7 If
the guerrilla group does not successfully convert the people to its
90. See Falk, supra note 1, at 186; Kreisberg, supra note 11, at 480-81.
91. See Falk, supra note 1, at 210-11; Farer, supra note 2, at 515.
92. See R. TABER, supra note 5, at 31, 156.
93. See J. CROSS, supra note 62, at 130.
94. See J. BELL, THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND
MALPRACTICE 22-23, 52-53 (1971); E. SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 272-77 (Evergreen ed.
1973). One scholar and participant in guerrilla warfare argues that the best method of
converting people to the guerrilla cause is by guerrilla military success, rather than simple
dissemination of propaganda. R. DEBRAY, REVOI.UTION WITHIN THE REVOI.UTION?: ARMEI)
STRUGGLE AND POLITICAl. STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA 47-59 (1967).
95. R. TABlER, supra note 5, at 31, 156.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 36-37, 57.
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cause, it will remain on the run. The acquisition of territory generally
begins in the countryside where opposition support is greatest and it is
most difficult for regular troops to defend. The takeover then gradu-
ally moves to small villages and towns and, in the final stages of the
revolution, to large cities.98
The guerrillas will establish bases in the territory that the govern-
ment is no longer capable of controlling. After the establishment of
such bases the opposition will institute an administrative structure.99
Commonly, the opposition administration will enact a code of law,
collect taxes, institute land reform, establish schools and hospitals, and
continue dissemination of its political ideas.' 0 The guerrillas are now
in position to influence the economic, as well as the political and mili-
tary, welfare of the country. They also control resources that make
victory more likely.
It is generally in the best strategic interest of the United States to
wait until the guerrillas control and administer a portion of the coun-
try. United States support for an unrepresentative opposition group
hurts United States policy in several ways.
United States support may cause irritation in this country's rela-
tions with other states. Although international law does not always
play a dominant role in domestic policy debates, it plays a significant
role in international diplomacy.' 0 ' Most scholars agree that, even in
this age of uncertainty about the laws of civil war, aid to unrepresenta-
tive opposition groups or rebels propelled from abroad is a disfavored
state action in the international community.' 0 2 United States adher-
ence to the belligerency guidelines assures that the nation avoid one of
the most egregious state actions with respect to civil wars.
The greatest discomfort in international relations usually comes
from allies in the region where the illegal intervention occurs. Those
allies must work closely with the incumbent government on a day-to-
day basis. If the opposition does not have legitimacy or a realistic
chance of prevailing in the civil war, the neighboring countries do not
98. Id. at 36-37; R. DEBRAY, supra note 94, at 59-67 (the fight in the countryside is more
important to the revolution than urban insurrection).
99. R. TABER, supra note 5, at 40; Mifao's Primeron Guerrilla War (S. Griffith trans.). in THE
GUERRILLA AN) How To FIGHT HIM 7 (T. Greene ed. 1962).
100. R. TABER. supra note 5, at 40-42; see 1.000 Rebels Surrender in Philippines. Seattle
Times, June 17. 1987, at A 1l, col. I (leftist shadow government exposed that collected taxes in
villages).
101. W. Ri VELIY, supra note 84, at 20; Kreisberg, supra note 11. at 483-85: Van Dyke. The
Riddle of Establishing Clear and Workable Rules To Govern Armed Conflicts. 3 UCLA P.,c.
BASIN L.J. 38 (1984).
102. See Higgins, supra note 8, at 184: Sohn. supra note 50. at 227.
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want to alienate the incumbent government by supporting the opposi-
tion. They are acutely aware that the incumbent government may be
in power for some duration and must be reckoned with.
Moreover, regional allies that act as a way station for the guerrillas
may become hotbeds for anti-United States tension.'°3 If the guerril-
las anger the host country, the host's anger will not only be directed
toward the guerrillas. It will also be directed at the 'United States
which supports the guerrillas and will not allow the host to deal
harshly with the guerrillas or to move the guerrillas out of the country
entirely. It is not uncommon for a friendly government to be damaged
by abetting a controversial United States policy.
0 4
Giving assistance to illegitimate opposition groups can also erode
domestic congressional 10 5 and grassroots10 6 support for American for-
eign policy. A great deal of energy is spent trying to pull along and
persuade a reluctant Congress to support an opposition group that has
not demonstrated that it is a legitimate representative of the people in
its country. Garnering this support disperses and dilutes political
energy that could be channeled in other directions."0 7 Support of
unrepresentative opposition groups can also enrage a significant
number of private citizens, resulting in acts of civil disobedience.'0 8
American support of an opposition group that is not a legitimate
representative of a substantial segment of a foreign people also alien-
ates the United States from the foreign citizens who are caught in the
civil war. If a substantial number of people are not supporting the
opposition, it is often an expression that: One, although not entirely
satisfied with the incumbent regime, they are not so dissatisfied so as
to resort to arms; two, the opposition group is not the people's choice
as a replacement for the incumbent; three, the guerrillas' ideology has
103. See Reichler & Wippman, supra note 72, at 471 (none of the countries presently under
armed attack, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, admits supporting the contras; Costa Rica
has condemned U.S. support); The Contras Won't Change, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1987, at 31-32
(unrest caused in Honduras due to contras).
104. See CentralAnerican Leaders Push for August Summit, Seattle Times, June 17, 1987, at
A5, col. I (point of contention between the United States and Honduras is whether contras can
stay in Honduras); Honduras Reportedly Wants Contras Out by June 15. Seattle Times, June 5.
1987, at A2, col. 1; Costa Rica Strains To Handle Refugees, Seattle Times/Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Mar. 15, 1987, at All, col. 1 (war between contras and Sandinistas has created
massive flow of refugees into Costa Rica, which causes Costa Rican government political and
social problems).
105. See W. REVELEY, supra note 84, at 20, 186.
106. See id. at 20.
107. See McNeil, Central America: US. Fantasyland, Seattle Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at A 1.
col. I (Iran-contra aid controversy and lack of bipartisan support strangled Caribbean Basin
Initiative and debt relief, which at one time enjoyed broad support).
108. See infra notes 152-54.
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not taken root; and four, the guerrillas have not convinced the people
that success is probable.' 0 9 If a substantial portion of the population
has not embraced the opposition, then the people are less likely to
tolerate the dangerous conditions of war. People will be willing to
accept those dangers if the incumbent government is too oppressive
and the opposition is the people's hope. 1 ' If the rebels are operating
outside the will of the people, the people will be angry at the rebels and
the country that is forcing war onto their fields and roads. In the long
run, alienating the citizens of a country has more damaging conse-
quences than angering one foreign government. Governments come
and go, but the memories of the people are not easily expunged.
If the President seeks to give assistance to a representative opposi-
tion group, there is a greater chance that the aid can be given overtly,
avoiding the need to resort to covert assistance. Decisions that are
subjected to the public policy process are likely to be more in tune
with foreign and domestic tolerance for intervention. 1 1' While public
airing of the issue of whether to support a certain group may draw
some opposition, a public airing also allows the President to actively
procure public support for the proposed intervention. Intervention
that has been conceived and directed from the confines of the execu-
tive offices has often led to severe policy errors because the decisions
did not accurately account for national and international reactions.' 12
United States intervention absent public support has likewise led to
unhappy foreign policy results.' 13 The wisdom of a foreign policy
publicly debated and publicly supported is reflected in our constitu-
tional framework which gives Congress power in decisions of financial
assistance in support of United States foreign policy objectives'14 and
the right to declare war.115
Beyond the domestic problems of covert assistance, covert assist-
ance can tend to have a corrupting influence on relations with other
109. See R. TABER, supra note 5. at 20, 31.
110. See id. at 31.
I11. W. RtVr.ii-., supra note 84. at 186.
112. Id. at 188.
113. Consensus on military decisions is most firm when it is the product of decision by the
legislative process, responsive to the views of citizens whose interests are affected. Id. at 17&
The full play of representative democracy is most likely to produce policy in the general interest.
Id. If most citizens do not at least acquiesce in national policy, the country plunges into
controversy with potentially grim impact on United States effectiveness at home and abroad.
Versaillcs and Vietnam show the consequences of internal di% ,sion over United States initiatives
overseas. Id. at 176.
114. W. Ri-Vi izY. supra note 84. at 44.
115. See H. SUMMiLRS. ON SiR.\, xii : A CR'i-icxi ANAI YSIS OI 'i Hi ViTN SM W R
33-69 (1982).
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countries. If the aid is covert, the foreign government will have to
make denials regarding United States involvement when evidence of
the United States' intervention comes to light. The process of covering
for the United States ultimately taints the credibility of the foreign
government in the eyes of the international community and its own
citizens, which can undercut its stature.
The requirement of control and administration of territory by the
opposition may play a catalytic, as well as a restraining role in United
States foreign policy. Congress or the executive may be more inclined
to support a shift in support from an unpopular incumbent govern-
ment to a legitimate opposition if standards for recognizing a viable
opposition group are the law. Once the belligerency standards are
met, a President, Senator, or a member of Congress could urge that
the time has come to recognize that the people have cast their lot with
another group and the time is right to become allied with the inevita-
ble successor, before the successor becomes completely alienated from
the United States. Such a move might help ease out a teetering despot
or push along peace negotiations that have been stalled because the
incumbent government feels safely propped up by United States sup-
port. Of course the United States need not recognize an opposition
group that meets the control and administration tests. The belliger-
ency standards are a good guide to political legitimacy, however, and
could be an important factor on those occasions when the United
States decides to side with the armed opposition against an old incum-
bent ally.
The test for the recognition of an armed opposition group as a bel-
ligerent also provides that the opposition group abide by international
law." 6 Of particular concern is the requirement that the opposition
group comply with those laws of war demanding respect for human
rights." 7 This element of the belligerency test is important for several
reasons. First, human rights violations by the armed opposition
against its fellow citizens provides evidence that the group is not the
legitimate representative of the people. Opposition group human
rights violations erode popular support-the very support that is cru-
cial to the opposition's ultimate success. 1 8 This notion is consistent
with guerrilla war strategy. 9 A fundamental tenet of modern guer-
116. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 1, at 167.
117. See Lobel & Rafner, Is United States Military Intervention in Central America Illegal?.
12 Hum. RTs. 23, 25, 40 (1984).
118. See Salvadorans Flee Farms After Reported Rise in Brutal Rebel Abuses, Seattle Times/
Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 26, 1987, at A24, col. 1.
119. See R. TABER, supra note 5, at 154.
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rilla warfare is that the fighters not treat the people roughly or steal
from them. Successful guerrilla leaders insist upon rigid discipline and
scrupulously correct behavior by the soldiers in order to prevent them
from alienating the local population.'2 °
Opposition group human rights violations also erode Congressional
and grassroots support in the United States. Recent legislation grant-
ing aid to the contra rebels contains provisions that show Congress'
concern that the armed opposition not violate human rights.' 2'
Again, the belligerency test generally assures that the United States
supports an opposition group that has legitimacy and popularity both
at home and in the United States.
C. Implementation of the Belligerency Standards
by the United States
One of the difficulties in proposing legal standards for regulating
intervention in civil war is enforcement. As mentioned before, some
scholars propose that supranational organizations perform this role. 122
The chances seem remote, presently, that any such organization is in a
position strong enough to enforce international laws of civil war. 123 So
long as authority in the international community remains decentral-
ized, the most effective legal restraints are those that are applied from
within, rather than from without, a sovereign state.' 24 States must
120. See, e.g., Mao's Primer on Guerrilla War, supra note 99, at 6-7.
All actions are subject to command; do not steal from the people; be neither selfish nor
unjust. Replace the door [used as a bed in summer] when you leave the house; roll up the
bedding in which you have slept; be courteous; be honest in your transactions; return what
you borrow; replace what you break; do not bathe in the presence of the women: do not
without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.
Id. at 6.
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a
belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people
and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.
How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only the undisciplined troops
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of his native element, cannot
live.
Id. at 6-7.
121. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591. 1986 U.S.
CoDt- CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3341; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3191 (Boland
amendment); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1003.
122. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
124. W. REVF.Y, supra note 84, at 266; McDougal, supra note 63, at 24.
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police their own behavior and bring whatever pressure they can to
bear on states that deviate from the legal norm.
An international standard concerning intervention in civil war can
be enforced for United States foreign policy by Congress. Congress
could adopt permanent guidelines that incorporate international law
belligerency standards for granting aid to opposition groups. Congress
is the best body to enforce the belligerency standards because of its
constitutional role in foreign policy. Article I gives Congress control
over raising federal funds, authorizing expenditures, and appropriat-
ing funds for foreign aid.125 Financial assistance to an opposition
group ultimately depends on the action of Congress, which can condi-
tion its grants.' 26
Congress has conditioned use of funds on several occasions. For
example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 prohibited the use of
funds for troops or advisors in Cambodia, and the 1973 Supplemental
Appropriations Act denied use of funds for combat activities in North
or South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.'27 Congress has conditioned
aid grants to the government in El Salvador and to the contra rebels in
Nicaragua. 28
Congressional involvement is important because it builds executive-
legislative consensus in foreign affairs. National consensus on foreign
policy decisions is most prevalent when the decisions are the product
of the legislative process.129 Legislative approval generally assures
widespread popular support for the intervention in war. Congress also
plays an important role in revising and pointing out defects in foreign
policy decisions; it is removed from the initial executive decision to
act, and may be closer to other national and international constituen-
cies that will be affected by the policy.'t °
Although Congress has given aid to opposition groups with condi-
tions attached, the conditions have been formulated on a case-by-case
basis. Congress has often acted under heavy pressure from the execu-
tive branch, after the President had already taken steps toward com-
125. U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § 8; W. REVELEY, supra note 84, at 44-45.
126. W. REVELEY, supra note 84, at 126.
127. Id. at 122.
128. See the discussion in Lobel & Rafner, supra note 117, at 38, 40. See also NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 13, 1987, at 32 (Republican Senators threaten to withdraw support for contra funds unless
administration puts more into peaceful solutions); President Shifts Focus of Argument for
Contras, Seattle Times, May 4, 1987, at A8, col. 3 (focus away from military realm to that of
promoting free speech and elections).
129. W. REVELEY, supra note 84, at 178; H. SUMMERS, supra note 115, at 33-69.
130. W. REVELEY, supra note 84, at 188.
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mitting the United States in a civil war.' 3 '
Congress should install permanent criteria to be used in deciding
whether to support armed opposition groups. If these criteria are in
place in advance of executive action, the President will have to tailor
his or her actions to comply with Congressional standards. 132 The
President will know that financial assistance will not be forthcoming,
or will come at a very high political price, if a proposal to support an
opposition group does not meet Congressional standards. The bellig-
erency standards should be the centerpiece of the Congressional
standards.
Congress need not fund an opposition group even if the group meets
the initial requirements for assistance. These requirements should be
used as a practical threshold test, with the ultimate decision to be
made with an eye toward other relevant political factors. For exam-
ple, although a Marxist guerrilla group meets the belligerency thresh-
old, Congress may not want to assist the group due to its political
orientation. This allows Congress to have flexibility in its decision
making, but also gives it a measure of control and continuity over
United States grants of assistance to opposition groups in civil strife.
In addition to taking the initiative in passing permanent standards,
Congress needs to take a more active role in enforcing the conditions
that it sets on grants of assistance to groups involved in civil war. In
the past, Congress has often left monitoring to the executive. 33 But
Congress need not do so. It has power under the Constitution to
investigate other branches of government preparatory to lawmaking or
while overseeing execution of acts of Congress.' 34 With respect to the
belligerency standards, Congress can independently assess whether an
armed opposition group effectively controls a significant portion of
national territory, has set up an administrative structure there, and
whether the opposition group is respecting international law.
VI. THE BELLIGERENCY TEST AS A WORLD
STANDARD: ANSWERING THE CRITICS
Nations need not return to the days of formal declarations of bellig-
erency. The United States, however, should urge other nations to
employ the belligerency standards as a threshold test for assisting
131. Id. at 137-38.
132. See id. at 195-96.
133. See Lobel & Rafner, supra note 117, at 38 (President required to make certification
under law granting aid to El Salvador).
134. W. Ri-vt.-LY, supra note 84, at 30.
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armed opposition groups. The standards can be memorialized in trea-
ties and United Nations resolutions; they can be raised in diplomatic
contacts and public pronouncements on the legality of assistance.
As discussed previously, the belligerency test has been criticized in
recent scholarship. Commentators acknowledge that the international
law of civil war requires some way of demonstrating the legitimacy of
an opposition group. 135 Commentators fail to recognize, however,
that the belligerency standards closely follow the way in which armed
opposition groups gain legitimacy in modern civil wars. Moreover,
the standards are not divorced from the theory of modern guerrilla
war as some suggest.' 36  Control of territory, establishment of an
administrative regime, and respect for international law are integral
aspects of successful guerrilla warfare. 137
Critics of the belligerency test contend that it is unenforceable
because there is no international body to effectively determine when
the belligerency standards have been met.' 38 However, this criticism
is applicable to most laws of war. Enforceability of an international
law of civil strife is tested by whether the law comports with state
interest and the strategic reality of civil war. 139
Democratic governments such as the United States face substantial
foreign and domestic political costs when they support illegitimate
opposition groups, as discussed above." Based on these costs alone,
it may be wise for a government to adopt the belligerency standards.
Totalitarian governments such as the Soviet Union, however, also face
ample costs when they support unpopular opposition groups. The
Soviets naturally come under criticism in the West for such support,
which can be costly in terms of trade and other benefits of normalized
relations with the West. 14 1 Perhaps more importantly, the Soviets
alienate countries in the developing world when they assist illegitimate
opposition groups and incumbent governments. Soviet support of
opposition groups that lack popular support also undermines Soviet
claims that it is assisting peoples fighting for self-determination.
135. Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 31 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
136. Higgins, supra note 8, at 171.
137. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
138. Falk, supra note 1, at 206; Higgins, supra note 8, at 171.
139. Boals, supra note 22, at 336-37.
140. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
141. See Schachter, supra note 56, at 127; cf Soviets Backing off on Aid to Nicaragua, Seattle
Times, Nov. 16, 1987, at A2, col. 4 (Soviet desires to conclude nuclear weapons treaty with
United States contribute to Sandinista's decision to negotiate with the contras).
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VII. APPLICATION OF THE BELLIGERENCY
STANDARDS TO CONTEMPORARY ARMED
OPPOSITION GROUPS
The United States currently gives assistance to several armed oppo-
sition groups, including the opposition in Afghanistan. 142 The opposi-
tion in Afghanistan represents the majority of Afghans. 143  The
government in power was forced on the country by a foreign power
and does not legitimately represent the people. Despite overwhelming
Soviet firepower, the opposition controls substantial area in the coun-
tryside and the mountain regions. 44 They govern those areas just as
they did before the Soviet intervention. While the Soviets have been
criticized for human rights violations, the opposition seems to respect
the rights of its country members.
145
The United States has also begun aiding Jonas Savimbi's National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola ("UNITA"). UNITA
comes very close to meeting the belligerency elements. It controls
about one-third of the national territory and a similar percentage of
the population. It is not clear, however, whether UNITA has estab-
lished an administrative system in the territory it holds.' 4 6 The
UNITA forces may not be abiding by the laws of war; there have been
reports of human rights abuses. 147 Even if UNITA satisfies the bellig-
erency test, some scholars contend that strong foreign policy factors
should persuade Congress not to assist UNITA.
14 8
The legitimacy of the opposition group and the illegitimacy of the
incumbent regime has made financial assistance to the Afghan rebels
easy to come by. By contrast, when aid to the Nicaraguan contra
rebels is proposed, the victories for the executive branch, if they come,
142. Insurgencies: Two of a Kind, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1987, at 32-33; see generally Rubin,
Afghanistan: The Resistance Has an Opportunity, International Herald-Tribune, Aug. 18, 1987,
at 4, col. 3.
143. Karp, The War in Afghanistan, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1986, at 1040.
144. Id. at 1031-32 ("The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan remains essentially a city-
state, with military outposts in the hinterland and a secure civilian presence only in Kabul and a
few other towns."); see also Okun, The Situation in Afghanistan. DEPT ST. BULL., Jan. 1987, at
84-86.
145. See Situation of Huinan Rights in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/41/778 (1986): AMNESTY
INTE-RNATIONAL, AFGHANISTAN: TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS (1986).
146. See Smith, A Trap in Angola. FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1986, at 64-65. See generally
Marcum, Angola: Twenty-Five Years of War, CURRENT HISTORY, May 1986, at 193; Dancing to
a Tin Drummer, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 47.
147. Marcum, supra note 146, at 230.
148. Smith, supra note 146, at 74.
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are pared down and conditioned.' 49 Many members of Congress
believe in the legitimacy of the Sandinista government, at least relative
to the contras.150 The contras have made some progress and have the
support of some citizens, but the contras control little national terri-
tory. Their support is often undercut by human rights abuses against
peasants.' 51 These rights abuses also undercut United States support
for the opposition.
United States support for the contras has generated a great deal of
fervent opposition at the grassroots level. Numerous citizens organi-
zations send aid to the Sandinistas.' 52 Some American citizens go in
person to help the Nicarguan government, in defiance of the United
States embargo on aid to the Sandinistas. 5 3  Contra aid is also the
subject of consistent nonviolent protests nationwide which often tie up
the police and the courts.
154
Since the contras have not demonstrated their legitimacy, American
support has been criticized in the international forum as United States
sponsored intervention, rather than indigenous uprising. Even loyal
Latin American allies have been loathe to rally to the contras at the
149. See, e.g., Sending "A Clear Signal". Congress Sets the Stage for New Contra-Aid Fight,
Seattle Times, Mar. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 4. Both the Reagan administration and Congress have
recognized that the contras do not meet the belligerency standards. See DEPT. OF STATE,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS 962-63 (1985) (transcript of White House press
briefing, Feb. 16, 1985); H.R. Res. 1777, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (by a vote of 103 for and
257 against, the House rejected an amendment to the State Department authorization bill to
characterize the contras as legitimate insurgents and expressing the sense of Congress that
President Reagan recognize a state of belligerency in Nicaragua under international law).
150. See Serafino, U.S. Assistance to Nicaraguan Guerrillas: Issues for Congress, Issue Brief,
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service 1, 10 (Mar. 17,
1987) (available from the Library of Congress, Order Code IB84139).
151. See, eg., The New Contras?, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1987, at 32-39; Opposition Leader
Joins Contra Ranks, Seattle Times/Post-Intelligencer, May 31, 1987, at A8, col.l (bolstering
"moderate" ranks within the contra leadership); Contras Are Gaining Momentum in Nicaragua,
Say Eyewitnesses, Seattle Times, Apr. 29, 1987, at A10, col. 1; Contras Called Ready After
Training in U.S., Seattle Times, Mar. 24, 1987, at A4, col. 1.
152. See "Quest for Peace'" Groups Counter U.S. Aid to Contras by Raising $30 million for
Other Side, Seattle Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at A12-13, col. 1. Since 1981 some 60,00 Americans
have visited Nicaragua. At least 500 groups nationwide work for the end of United States aid to
the contras. Those groups claim to have raised S30.2 million in goods and services for aid to the
Nicaraguan government in an attempt to match the $100 million in aid given by the United
States to the contras. Id; see also Pragmatic Engineer Working in Nicaragua "Was' "t There To
Die," Seattle Times, Apr. 30, 1987, at A3, col. 1; Seattle Times, Apr. 30, 1987, at A3, col. 6.
153. See supra note 152.
154. See, e.g., UW Confrontation over Ben Linder Leads to an Arrest, Seattle Times, May 2,
1987, at A10, col. 1; Big Protest Snarls Traffic Near CIA, Seattle Times, Apr. 27, 1987, at A2, col.
5; Thousands Join March on Capitol, Seattle Times/Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 26, 1987, at Al, col.
5.
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urging of the United States.' 5 5 Moreover, contra presence in Hondu-
ras and Costa Rica has led to friction between those countries and the
United States. 1
5 6
The United States has also begun channeling aid to the armed oppo-
sition in Kampuchea. The opposition in Kampuchea does not meet
the belligerency test. Although the forces of the three groups compris-
ing the opposition have grown in size and effectiveness, they do not
control a significant portion of national territory.'5 7 The grip on the
territory that they do hold is probably too weak to administer the ter-
ritory. The opposition has had difficulty achieving broad participation
in its struggle, even though the incumbent regime in Phom Phem was
installed by Vietnam.' 58 This may be explained by the predominance
of the widely hated Khmer Rouge in the opposition and the failure of
the two non-communist groups to demonstrate an ability to defeat the
Vietnamese-backed government in the battlefield. Some scholars
argue that aid to the the opposition groups may be ill-advised in any
event. '
59
VIII. CONCLUSION
The international law of civil war is in flux. The international com-
munity would be served best by reemphasizing the traditional test of
belligerency. In this way, governments may assist opposition groups
as state interest requires, but only those groups that are legitimate rep-
resentatives of the people. International adherence to the belligerency
standards protects persons in a country from premature intervention
by a foreign power, and protects the foreign power from the political
costs of such intervention.
The United States, through Congress, should adopt the belligerency
standards as a permanent threshold test for assisting armed opposition
groups. The United States should also begin to stress the standards in
the international community in treaties, United Nations resolutions,
and diplomatic practice.
155. See Reichler & Wippman, supra note 72, at 471; see also Costa Rica Forbids Contra
Group To Meet. Seattle Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at A4. col. 1.
156. See supra note 155, The Contras Won t Change NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1987. at 31-32:
Honduras Reportedly Wants Contras Out by June 15, Seattle Times, June 5, 1987. at A2. col. I.
157. See Gordon, The Third Indochina Conflict, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1986, at 66-74.
158. See generally Bach, A Chance in Cambodia, FOREIGN POLY, Spring 1986, at 75-95:
Becker, Stalemate in Cambodia. CURRENT HIST., Apr. 1987, at 156-58; Sihanouk Calls for More
Rebel Unity. International Herald-Tribune, Aug. 31, 1987, at 2, col. 6.
159. Gordon, supra note 157, at 82.
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